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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-3879 
 ___________ 
 
 MARINA SADULAEVA, 
a/k/a Marina Movsarovna Sadulaeva, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A93 409 850) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 4, 2011 
 
 Before:  BARRY, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed January 13, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Marina Sadulaeva, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan (officially the Kyrgyz Republic), was 
admitted to the United States in February 2004 with authorization to remain for six 
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months.  She overstayed her period of admission and, in 2007, was charged with 
removability pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B) [8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B)].  Sadulaeva conceded that she was removable as an overstay, but 
sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).   
Sadulaeva testified that she was persecuted on account of her mixed ethnicity; her 
father is Chechnyan and her mother is Russian.  Sadulaeva claimed that, as a result, her 
entry into medical school was delayed, she did not regularly receive financial aid, she had 
limited access to library books, she was denied a dorm room, and she had difficulty 
finding a position as a medical resident upon graduation.  Sadulaeva also claimed that she 
was persecuted on account of her religion; she is an evangelical Christian.  Although she 
was able to worship in other parishioners’ homes, her neighbors became irritated when 
she hosted prayer groups at her house.  In the summer of 2002, a rock was thrown 
through her window with a note calling her “Christian dirt” and telling her to get out of 
Kyrgyzstan.  In addition, someone tampered with her apartment keyhole, left a burned 
copy of a Christian magazine under her door, and urinated on her doormat.  Later that 
year, Sadulaeva was assaulted on the street.  One of the assailants rubbed her chest and 
pushed her.  During the attack, she was warned, “If you won=t stop delivering your 
witchcraft religion, next time we will have [a] different . . . talk with you.”  Sadulaeva did 
not report the incident to the police because she believed they would not help her and 
because she did not want her work colleagues to learn about the incident.  In May 2003, 
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Sadulaeva was participating in an evangelical music concert when young ethnic Kyrgyz 
arrived, broke the performers’ instruments, verbally assaulted them, and punched and 
kicked Sadulaeva.  The most serious attack occurred in July 2003, when Sadulaeva and 
other Christians had gathered to conduct baptisms.  Kyrgyz assailants grabbed 
Sadulaeva’s face, tore her Bible, and hit her back.  She claimed that she could not walk 
for one month, but there is no indication that she sought medical treatment.  The police 
refused to investigate.  Since arriving in the United States, Sadulaeva has learned of 
incidents in Kyrgyzstan where a Baptist Church was set on fire, where religious literature 
was burned, and where missionaries were prevented from operating freely. 
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Sadulaeva’s requests for relief, concluding 
that the incidents she described did not rise to the level of persecution and that evidence 
of current country conditions undermined her claimed fear of future persecution.
1
  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) agreed that Sadulaeva’s experiences were not 
sufficiently severe to constitute past persecution.  The Board also concluded that she had 
not established an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution, in part because the 
State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report indicated that Sadulaeva’s 
church is the largest Protestant church in Kyrgyzstan and that religious groups operate 
with little interference from the government or each other. 
                                                 
1
 Although Sadulaeva’s asylum application was filed more than one year after her 
arrival in the United States, see INA § 208(a)(2)(B), the IJ concluded that it was timely 
pursuant to a statutory exemption for changed country conditions.  See INA 
§ 208(a)(2)(D). 
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Sadulaeva filed a timely petition for review.
2
  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
INA § 242 [8 U.S.C. § 1252].  Because the BIA adopted the findings of the IJ and also 
commented on the sufficiency of the IJ’s determinations, this Court will review the 
decisions of both the BIA and the IJ.  See Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Review of these decisions is for substantial evidence, considering whether they 
are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record 
considered as a whole.”  Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(citations omitted).  The decisions must be affirmed “unless the evidence not only 
supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F. 3d 463, 471 
(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir. 2001)).  
An applicant for asylum has the burden of establishing that she is unable or 
unwilling to return to her home country “because of [past] persecution or a well-founded 
fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion[.]”  INA § 101(a)(42)(A).  Persecution 
“connotes extreme behavior, including threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic 
restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 
341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted).  Mere threats 
generally do not amount to persecution unless “they are of a highly imminent and 
menacing nature.”  Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2005).  
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 Sadulaeva originally filed the petition for review in the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit.  By order dated September 29, 2009, the Second Circuit transferred the petition 
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On appeal to the BIA, Sadulaeva conceded that none of the incidents described 
above individually constitute persecution.  The BIA properly explained that, even 
considered cumulatively, Sadulaeva’s experiences represent merely the kind of 
generalized criminal conduct, harassment, and intimidation that does not rise to the level 
of persecution.  See Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2008); Lie v. 
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005).  Notably, the threat to “have [a] different . . . 
talk with you,” issued after Sadulaeva was groped and pushed, was not especially 
menacing.  See Chavarria v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006).  None of the 
injuries she received were particularly severe.  See Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 
(3d Cir. 2005).  Furthermore, she ultimately was able to overcome her difficulties in 
medical school and graduate without harm.  Cf. Abdelmalek v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 19, 
23-24 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding that ability to graduate from medical school 
undermined claim of persecution on account of religion). 
Sadulaeva also failed to show a well-founded fear of future persecution.  In 
support of her claim, Sadulaeva pointed to three news articles and the 2007 State 
Department Religious Freedom Report.  The articles, from 2006 and 2007, reference an 
arson attack on a Baptist Church, quote a pastor who asserted that intolerance of 
Christians in south Kyrgyzstan is growing, and report the murder of an ethnic Kyrgyz 
convert to Christianity.  The State Department Report indicates that Kyrgyzstan’s largest 
Protestant Church had complained of government attempts to hamper its activities in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
for review to this Court.   
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past.  We conclude that this evidence does not compel the conclusion that Sadulaeva 
faces an individualized risk of persecution or that there is a pattern or practice of 
persecution in Kyrgyzstan on account of ethnicity or religion.  Lie, 396 F.3d at 537 
(holding that, in order to constitute a “pattern or practice,” the persecution of a group 
must be “systemic, pervasive, or organized.”). 
 For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review.   
 
